On Robust Constitution Design by Auriol, Emmanuelle & Gary-Bobo, Robert J.
On Robust Constitution Design
Emmanuelle Aurioly and Robert J. Gary-Bobo z
December 2001, revised August 2006.
Abstract
We study a class of representation mechanisms, based on reports made by a random
subset of agents, called representatives, in a collective choice problem with quasi-linear
utilities. We do not assume the existence of a common prior probability describing the
distribution of preference types. In addition, there is no benevolent planner. Decisions
will be carried out by an individual who cannot be assumed impartial, a self-interested
executive. These assumptions impose new constraints on Mechanism Design. A robust
mechanism is dened as maximizing expected welfare under a vague prior probability
distribution, and over a set of mechanisms which is at the same time immune from
opportunistic manipulations by the executive, and compatible with truthful revela-
tion of preferences by representatives. Robust mechanisms are characterized and their
existence is shown. Sampling Groves mechanisms are shown to be robust.
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1 Introduction
Practitioners and applied economists express some dissatisfaction with the literature on
Mechanism Design and the implementation of collective-decision rules, in particular when
they discuss applications to public decision-making. There are at least two lines of attack.
One is simplicity, or realism: it is commonly argued that the mechanisms exhibited by pure
theory are often too complex or contrived to be reasonably understood by economic agents
and implemented in practice. The other one is robustness: theoretical mechanisms would be
too fragile, too dependent on some form of ne tuning to resist mistakes, collective manip-
ulations of various kinds, or deviations from rationality made by agents. These criticisms
have been recognized by students of Mechanism Design since a long time. However, because
of the genuine di¢ culty of the task, the concepts of simplicity and robustness have not yet
acquired well-dened meanings in the theoretical literature. In the present contribution, we
put the emphasis on one possible aspect of mechanism robustness.
The denition of robustness that we consider below is inspired by the specic prob-
lems of public decision-making, and by the idea of an application to the analysis of political
institutions in a representative democracy. We propose to study optimal collective decision
mechanisms under the assumption that there is no benevolent planner on which to rely, and
without assuming that probabilistic beliefs are common, and common knowledge. In other
words, we assume that all decisions are made by real(as opposed to ctive) individuals,
that these real individuals are endowed with preferences, thus pursuing some private in-
terest, and we do not assume that the structure of preferences is well known by agents, in
the form of a common prior. The spirit of the present contribution is to remove the benev-
olence assumption in normative analysis1, while simultaneously removing the Harsanyian
assumption that a description of society, taking the form of a prior probability distribution,
1In The Making of Economic Policy, A. Dixit (1996, p. 8) writes, As a crude but e¤ective caricature,
one can say that normative policy analysis began by supposing that the policy was made by an omnipotent,
omniscient, and benevolent dictator. The work on second best removed the omnipotence. That on infor-
mation removed the omniscience. However, the assumption of benevolence and dictatorship have remained
una¤ected by all these improvements in our understanding of the limits on instruments and information.(...)
The normative approach continues to view policy-making as a purely technical problem.
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is common knowledge. In contrast, in our theory, the purpose of public decision mechanisms
will be to produce relevant, but otherwise non-existent information at some cost. Due to
the absence of benevolence, the way information is processed, and the mechanism itself,
should resist opportunistic manipulations. This context imposes additional constraints on
mechanism design, on top of the classic incentive compatibility constraints.
In the following, we consider an economy with a nite number of agents. Some public
decision must be made, such as producing a public good. Utilities are quasi-linear, allowing
for possibilities of compensation by means of money transfers. The agentsprivate valuations
for the public decision are unknown. The distribution of valuations in the economy can be
described by a probability measure which is not assumed to be common knowledge. Some
information on preferences must be produced by the institutions, and information production
is costly. To capture this, we assume that individuals need to pay some xed cost to be able
to transmit their valuation functions2.
We consider a family of mechanisms, called representation mechanisms, in which
some agents are drawn at random in the population and pay the xed cost to uncover
and to report their preferences. These individuals are called representatives. Society is
then divided into three subsets: (i) the representatives, who transmit information about
preferences, (ii) the passive citizens who are simple taxpayers, and (iii), the executive, which
is the agent in charge of executing public decisions. No agent is benevolent. The fact that
representatives are not benevolent imposes incentive compatibility constraints, to ensure
truthful reporting of preferences; the fact that the executive is not benevolent will impose
an additional requirement, called political robustness.
The classic framework of Mechanism Design is a particular case of the above described
setting in which, (i), all individuals can transmit at zero cost their personal characteristic or
type, (ii), all agents are representatives, and (iii), there implicitly exists a fully reliable and
benevolent executive body.
2Reporting a valuation function for a public decision generally involves a certain amount of work, like
reading les, listening to experts, etc., to understand the issue at hand and its consequences on the welfare
of individuals. Participating in representative institutions, where bargaining and voting take place, is a
time-consuming activity, and time has a non-negligible opportunity cost.
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Now, given that our goal is to propose a normative analysis, we will assume that
the constitution, a set of rules obeyed by all agents, is designed and written down by cti-
tious individuals called the Founding Fathers, behind the veil of ignorance. In contrast to
the real agents, the Founding Fathers are assumed benevolent, utilitarian and Bayesian
welfare maximizers; but they dont know the probability distribution describing the agents
preferences, and they know that they dont know it. In addition, the Founding Fathers know
that nobody will be impartial or benevolent. In spite of all this, they want their institu-
tions to function equally well in all possible future societies, the characteristics of which are
unknown to them. Their most di¢ cult problem can therefore be called an informational
robustness problem. The Founding Fathers feel a tension between their desire to limit op-
portunistic manipulation possibilities in the course of public decision-making, which imposes
a form of rigidity of rules, and at the same time, the need to adapt institutions to changing
patterns of the citizenspreferences, which requires exibility.
We dene as robust, a mechanism which is immune from manipulations (i.e., which
is robust in a political sense), and at the same time, maximizes expected welfare under
a vague prior probability distribution representing the Founding Fathersignorance (i.e., is
also robust in an informational sense). We provide a characterization of manipulation-
proof mechanisms, and show that a form of Groves mechanism3, applied to the subset of
representatives, is a fully robust solution, that is, both politically and informationally robust.
We nally illustrate the theory by means of an example.
Relationship with the literature
There are various approaches to robustness in the literature. Some authors have considered
the ability of agents to communicate before the (collective-decision) game is played, and,
if communication cannot be controlled, have studied the problem of communication-proof
implementation4. Other approaches have investigated the resistance of mechanisms with
respect to renegotiation phenomena, when, in essence, the number of stages or inter-agent
bargaining cannot be fully controlled. These considerations lead to the concept of durable
3On Groves and Clarke-Groves mechanisms, see Clarke (1971), Groves (1973), Green and La¤ont (1977),
Holmström (1979), Makowski and Ostroy (1987), Moulin (1988).
4See Palfrey and Srivastava (1991).
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or renegotiation-proof implementation5. The possibility of collusion between agents is of
course an important aspect of the problem, and there is a recent line of research on collusion-
proofness6. Other avenues can be explored, considering the idea of robustness with respect to
imperfections of rationality, knowledge, and common knowledge. The notion that the social
planner knows the relevant characteristics of a prior probability distribution describing the
population of agents, or that this prior is common to the agents, has also been questioned.
Weakening these assumptions can lead to dramatic changes in the results obtained.
In the recent years, a small number of contributions have appeared, that deal with
closely related problems, in particular in the neighboring eld of Optimal Auction Theory.
Segal (2003) studies optimal selling mechanisms when the distribution of buyersvaluations
is unknown; he changes Myersons7 approach on three points: (i) the seller does not know the
distribution of buyersvaluations and must therefore estimate it with the help of the buyers
actual bids; (ii) to get a prior-free pricing mechanism, the seller can rely on classical statistics8
(instead of Bayesian estimation); and (iii), he focuses on ex post mechanisms9, because more
general, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms would not be "detail-free", i.e., they
would depend on the buyersknowledge about the distribution of each others valuations,
while the seller himself is ignorant of the buyersbeliefs.
More recently, Chung and Ely (2004) have dealt with the theoretical justications
of dominant strategy (auction) mechanisms using a maximin, or "worst-case" approach.
To relax the common knowledge assumptions commonly used in the literature, they employ
universal Harsanyian type spaces10. When the seller does not have reliable information on the
the biddersbeliefs, and if these same beliefs satisfy a regularity condition, they show that the
5See, among many other contributions, Holmstrom and Myerson (1983), Maskin and Moore (1999).
6See, again among other contributions, La¤ont and Martimort (2000).
7See Myerson (1981).
8Segals mechanisms converge towards the optimal pricing rule when the number of buyers grows arbitrar-
ily large. See Gary-Bobo and Jaaidane (2000) for a related convergence result in the context of excludable
public goods.
9That is, in Segals context, mechanisms satisfying incentive compatibility in dominant strategies and ex
post individual rationality.
10See Mertens-Zamir (1985). An agents type includes a hierarchy of beliefs about other agentstypes and
beliefs: an agents preference type no longer uniquely determines her beliefs about the other individuals
preference types and beliefs.
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best dominant-strategy auction mechanism maximizes the sellers minimal expected revenue
over the set of Bayesian Incentive Compatible mechanisms, while the minimum is taken over
a set of possible beliefs of the agents. Finally, considering the Implementation of Social
Choice Rules, Bergemann and Morris11 (2004) focus on the notion of ex post equilibrium12;
their main result is that in separable environments (generalizing the usual quasi-linear utility
model), if a social choice rule is interim implementable on all type spaces, then, it is ex post
implementable. It follows that recourse to ex post incentive compatibility (or implementation
in dominant strategies in the independent private values case) is justied for a planner who
doesnt know the agentsbeliefs.
Several of the above quoted papers refer to Wilsons doctrine13, according to which
the weight of common knowledge assumptions should be "minimized" in Mechanism Design.
The present work clearly shares some features with the contributions quoted above; rst of
all because it weakens the common knowledge assumptions, but also because of a certain
"return" to dominant strategies. Instead of using a "worst-case" (i.e., maximin) approach
to select a robust mechanism, we assume that the mechanism designers ignorance can be
represented by a vague or di¤use prior on the distribution of agentspreferences itself; we
thus take limits on the Founding Fathersprior on possible distributions of agentscharacter-
istics, letting the prior become less and less "informative", and a form of the Clarke-Groves
mechanism appears to be a limit of the associated sequence of optimal mechanisms. Max-
imin could have been applied to our context as well. The vague prior approach is clearly a
decision-theoretic alternative to maximin. Finally, our approach has a "Public Choice" or
"Political Economy" avor. We not only weaken common knowledge assumptions, but also
remove the mechanism designers benevolence assumption. This leads us to separate the
11The quoted paper is the revised version of a Cowles Foundation manuscript, bearing the same title, and
circulated in 2001. The rst version of our paper is more or less contemporaneous (see Auriol and Gary-Bobo
(2002)).
12This concept boils down to equilibrium in dominant strategies in the simple case of independent private
values.
13See Wilson (1987). There are antecedents of this doctrine, already present in the closely related notion
of non-parametric mechanism discussed by Hurwicz (1972). See also the classic article by Ledyard (1978),
and Hagerty and Rogerson (1987).
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"executive", i.e., the person who collects agentsreports (and choses the outcome according
to rules), from the Founding Fathers, i.e., the ctitious benevolent designers, acting behind
the veil of ignorance.
In the following, Section 2 describes the model and states the assumptions. Section
3 is devoted to the notions of robustness. Section 4 contains the statement of our formal
results. Theorem 1 provides a characterization of politically robust mechanisms. Theorem 2
shows the existence of robust mechanisms. Section 5 is devoted to an illustrative example.
2 The Model
We consider an economy composed of N + 1 agents, indexed by i = 0; 1; :::; N . A public
decision denoted x should be chosen in a set X containing l elements, i.e., jXj = l. Agent
i will pay a tax denoted ti , which must be interpreted as a subsidy if it is negative. Each
agents utility function, denoted ui, depends on the public decision and the tax.
Assumption 1. (Quasi-linearity) Utilities are quasi-linear, and dened as ui(x; ti) = vi(x) 
ti, where vi : X  ! <, is a private valuation function.
These valuation functions are formally vectors vi = (vi(x))x2X belonging to <l, and
each of these vectors can be viewed as a drawing in some unknown probability distribution
P , with support V  <l.
Assumption 2. (Stochastic Independence) For all i, the vi are independent drawings from
the same distribution P . The distribution P has a well-dened mean.
Let EP denote the expectation operator, taken with respect to P . For all x 2 X, we
denote EP (vi (x)) = vP (x), the mean valuation of alternative x in the population described
by P . Agent i cannot reveal or transmit a type vi, unless he (or she) pays a xed cost14 F .
14The xed cost F can be viewed as the opportunity cost of becoming a representative. It can also be
viewed abstractly as the cost of transmitting a message about preferences. Another possible interpretation
is that the agents do not know their own preferences, unless they exert some costly e¤ort, and that at a
xed cost F , they learn their valuation function completely. The model is then as if we had assumed the
existence of a simplied information acquisition technology.
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Agent i is endowed with a probabilistic belief denoted Pi on the set of possible preferences,
describing what he or she believes about the preferences of other agents. These probabilities
can be viewed as purely subjective.
Our goal is now to provide a formal description of a constitution in this economy.
Because of the representation cost F , we focus on representation mechanisms. To be more
precise, in a representation mechanism, a subset of agents, of size n  N , represents the
entire society. Direct democracy (i.e., n = N) is a particular case. By denition, the
representatives are the agents labelled i, with i = 1; :::; n. They, (i), pay a xed cost F , and
(ii), transmit a message bvi 2 V to the mechanism. It cannot be taken for granted that reports
are truthful, and it follows that there will be a revelation problem. The inputs of the public
decision rule are the representativesreports, a vector denoted bv = (bv1; :::; bvn) 2 V n, and
some other inputs, called parameters, and denoted . Parameters are chosen in some set
. Without any loss of generality, we can assume that  has a product space structure, with
a nite number of factors b indexed by index b in some index set B, that is,  =
Q
b2B b,
and  = (1; :::; jBj). Parameter  describes all the aspects of the decision rule that must
be specied, all the controls that must be set, in order to obtain a well-dened choice. For
some decision rules,  includes parameters or moments of the probability distribution P (see
3.3. below).
Denition 1. A representation mechanism is an array (f; t;0), where 0   is an
admissible subset of parameters, f is the public decision rule, and t = (t0; t1; :::; tN) is a
vector of taxes. The vector (f; t) maps inputs of the decision rule into the set of public
decisions and tax allocations; formally,
(i) (f; t) : V n  0  ! X <N+1
(bv; ) 7! (f (bv; ) ; t (bv; )) ;
and,
(ii)
Pi=N
i=0 ti(bv; )  0:
Point (ii) in Denition 1 is of course the public budget constraint. It follows that budget im-
balance is not permitted by the constitutions considered here. For the sake of completeness,
we can formally dene a constitution as the specication of a representation mechanism for
8
each n, with 0  n  N 15.
In the economy described here, public decisions must be executed by at least one
agent, called the executive. The executive is conventionally indexed by i = 0. We assume
that a single individual is enough to execute decisions. Becoming an executive has an
opportunity cost F0 6= 0. All messages bv are transmitted to agent 0, in charge of execution.
He (or she) has the potentially important power to set the value of the parameters . By
denition, a parameter  is said to be specied in the constitution if 0 = fg.
Assumption 3. (Subsidiarity of the executive) Any input of the public decision rule which is
not provided by the representatives or specied in the constitution is chosen by the executive.
This assumption says that, a parameter value being needed to choose x = f(bv; ),
either  is carved in constitutional marble, that is, 0 = fg, or agent 0 chooses  2 0.
This aims at capturing the idea of bureaucratic manipulation power. We assume that the
executive has unknown preferences v0, drawn at random from the probability distribution
P . Being an agent, the executive will exploit any possibilities to distort the public decision
in the direction of his or her private preferences, if given the possibility to do so. He or
she would choose the value of  2 0 so as to maximize v0(f(bv; ))   t0(bv; ). We add the
following simple assumption,
Assumption 4. (Separation of Powers) The executive cannot be a representative.
The model should now describe the way of choosing representatives. Our goal is to
construct a simple and stylized model of an ideal representative democracy. We therefore
assume the existence of a perfect, costless, and non-manipulable representation technology:
the n representatives are a random sample of preferences.
Assumption 5. (Perfect random representation) The n representatives are independent
random drawings in the probability distribution P .
This assumption says that there exists a non-manipulable way of creating an unbi-
ased sample of the agentspreferences. A perfectelectoral system would do this job, and
our assumption has the merit of black-boxing the electoral process completely. This is of
15But n itself is not xed in the constitution.
9
course a strong assumption. In the real world, most representation systems are presumably
biased in the sense that the subset of representatives is not a reduced mirror image of the
peoples preferences. Our focus will not be the problem of the choice of representatives, even
if this problem is important, but to reveal and aggregate relevant private information in a
robust way, while keeping some democratic principles at work. Our goal being to construct
a normative theory of collective decision mechanisms, the idea of unbiased random represen-
tation captures an important democratic ideal. In this perspective, Assumption 5 provides
a desirable simplication, and we will adhere to this naive view of perfect representation.
We add the following assumption.
Assumption 6. (Weak equality) Indistinguishable individuals are treated equally by the
constitution.
Representative is tax schedule ti will be used to create revelation incentives, but individuals
indexed by i = 0 and i = n+ 1; :::; N , are indistinguishable. More precisely, in the economy
under study, an agent can only be distinguished from the other by his (her) preferences.
These preferences being unobserved, there is no basis for di¤erential tax treatment of those
whose preferences will never be revealed. It immediately follows from this that the same
tax t0 will be paid by any agent who does not belong to the subset of representatives. The
budget balance constraint thus writes,
(N + 1  n)t0 +
nX
i=1
ti = 0: (1)
To sum up, society has been partitioned into 3 subsets; the executive, indexed 0,
the representatives, indexed from 1 to n, and the passive citizens, indexed from n + 1 to
N . The representatives, who pay the xed cost F , are the only citizens which can transmit
information about their preferences. Representatives will be subject to revelation incentives,
while passive citizens (and agent 0) balance the budget16. The xed cost explains why direct
democracy is not necessarily optimal.
16Total population N could vary without any problem. In addition, the fact that X is xed is not really
a restriction. The model is general enough to describe a society subject to both demographic and technical
change. Assume that citizens are either alive or "in limbo". Further assume that limbo citizens have a zero
probability of being sampled and pay zero taxes, i.e., P is the probability distribution of living citizens. As
usual in the literature on revelation mechanisms, the utility of a citizen can be viewed as being private value
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3 Notion of Robustness
To give formal content to the idea of an impartial and benevolent point of view on society
and its constitutional rules, we assume the existence of ctitious agents called the Founding
Fathers. The Founding Fathers (hereafter the FF) choose the constitution. They are assumed
utilitarian, Bayesian, and benevolent. In addition, they know that they dont know the
true distribution of preferences P , and they know that, once the set of rules embodied in
the constitution will be put into use, there will not exist a single impartial or benevolent
individual to carry out public decisions. The FF want their constitution to be the best among
the politically robust ones. Optimality here, refers to maximization of an expected sum of
utilities, and political robustness, informally, means that the FF want their constitution to
resist manipulations. These requirements are problematic without the help of the common
knowledge assumption, since the true distribution of preferences is unknown, and the agents
probabilistic beliefs Pi are unknown (i.e., information is completely decentralized).
3.1 The Founding Fathersbeliefs
There are two classic ways of modelling a problem of decision under ignorance. One is to use
a non-probabilistic representation of ignorance such as the maximin principle, that is, in the
present context, maximize the minimum of expected welfare, where the minimum is taken
over some set of possible probability distributions representing society; the other is to remain
in the realm of Bayesian decision theory and to choose mechanisms which are optimal against
some vague or uninformative prior. We have chosen to follow the latter route. As is well
known from the Bayesian statistical literature, the recourse to non-informative priors can be
a delicate matter. To this end, the Founding Fatherssystem of beliefs will be assumed to
belong to a family containing non-informative priors as limit points.
Let Q denote the FFs system of probability judgments on preferences, it is a prob-
ability distribution on V N+1. The vector (v0; :::; vN) is a sequence of random valuation
minus some individual cost-share for decision x. Take X as being a very large set. Non-feasible decisions
can be represented by very low (in fact minus innity) utility values. Changes in P can thus represent both
changes in X and changes in population tastes.
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vectors, each belonging to V  <l. If we assume that the sequence (v0; :::; vN) is exchange-
able, i.e., that the probability of (v0; :::; vN) is the same under Q as that of any permutation
(v(0); :::; v(N)), then, extensions of de Finettis Theorem yield a representation for Q of the
following form: there exists a probability measure M on the space P of all distributions P
on V such that,
Q(v0; :::; vN) =
Z
P
NY
i=0
P (vi)dM(P ): (2)
In other words, the vi are independent, conditionally on the knowledge of a distribution P .
If P is unknown, then, the FFs probabilistic beliefs can be described with the help of a
prior M on the set of possible distributions P , and the beliefs Q are a mixture of a priori
possible P s. The model described by (2) is too general to be easily tractable in our economic
framework. But if we were ready to assume a little bit more about the FFs beliefs, we
would get a parameterized representation with a nice structure (see Bernardo and Smith
(1994), Chap. 4). To avoid useless sophistication, we directly assume that the FF have a
multivariate normal and fully exchangeable view of each valuation vector vi.
Assumption 7. (Normality of the Founding FathersConditional Beliefs.) Let Q denote a
possible probabilistic belief of the Founding Fathers. There exists a prior distribution M on
the parameter space A, such that
Q(v0; :::; vN) =
Z
A
NY
i=0
G(vi;)dM(); (3)
where G(vi;) is a multivariate normal distribution with parameter  2 A. Parameter 
writes  = (; T ), where  2 <l is a mean vector and T is an l l positive denite precision
matrix.
In the eyes of the FF, individual valuations vi are conditionally independent. The
parameter space A contains all pairs (; T ) with a vector in <l and a full rank, symmetric,
positive denite matrix, which has l(l + 1)=2 distinct elements lying above or on its main
diagonal17. Given that our goal is to provide a convenient representation of vague prior
knowledge, Assumption 7 is not very restrictive. The choice of the prior distribution M is
17The precision matrix of a multivariate normal distribution is dened as the inverse of its variance-
covariance matrix.
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essentially unrestricted, and normal distributions put probability weight on every region of
the space V = <l.
We dene a prior probability distribution M on the set A as di¤use if every open set
in A has a positive probability. Consider now the marginal distribution M of the random
parameter . The precision matrix of M is the inverse of its covariance matrix. Let T
denote this matrix, i.e., T = [CovM ()]
 1. Intuitively, a prior distribution of  is vague if its
precision matrix is close to zero. In the following, we will consider sequences of di¤use prior
distributions (Mr) with associated sequences of beliefs (Qr) and precision matrices (T r). The
FFsprior will be said to become vague when the associated sequence of precision matrices
(T r) vanishes, i.e., T r ! 0, as r ! +1, where 0 is the matrix each of whose elements is 0.
We now turn to a formal denition of a robust mechanism. Our robustness notion is
twofold. It has a political, and an informational aspect.
3.2 Political robustness
Political robustness, which entails the idea of immunity from political and bureaucratic
manipulations, encompasses more than the usual incentives constraints. In a nutshell, the
notion captures all the consequences of not having an omniscient, omnipotent and benevolent
planner at hand. Consider rst the revelation problem.
The representation mechanism should induce truthful revelation of the representa-
tivesprivate information. The revelation principle applies to the game restricted to the n
representatives, once they have paid the xed cost F . We therefore concentrate on direct
revelation mechanisms. Let Ei denote the expectation taken with respect to representative
is subjective probability distribution Pi. Let Ui(v;) = vi [f (v;)]  ti [v;] be representa-
tive is utility under the mechanism. By denition, the representation mechanism (f; t) is
revealing (in the Bayesian sense), if for all i = 1; :::; n, and all vi 2 V ,
Ei [Ui(v;) j vi]  Ei [Ui(bvi; v i;) j vi] ; for all bvi 2 V; (4)
where the usual notation v = (vi; v i) is employed. But, as soon as we have written this
denition, we see that the notion of a revealing mechanism (in the Bayesian sense) cannot
be very useful in this context, because such a mechanism is typically parameterized by the
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agentssubjective beliefs Pi, which are unknown to the FF, and to the executive. It then
seems that, in our model, the only useful mechanisms are those which are revealing, whichever
the agentsbeliefs. It is well-known that if a mechanism is revealing (in the Bayesian sense)
for all vector of subjective beliefs (P0; :::; PN), it is revealing in dominant strategies. To see
this, it is enough to remark that our representation mechanism should be revealing for beliefs
concentrated on a single point v i for each i. Rewriting (4) under this assumption, we get
the equivalent condition, for all i = 1; :::; n, all vi 2 V , and all v i 2 V n 1,
Ui(v;)  Ui(bvi; v i;); for all bvi 2 V; (5)
which is the denition of a dominant strategy revelation mechanism. Our political robust-
ness notion should therefore embody the requirement that (f; t) is revealing in dominant
strategies.
This step can be given a formal justication. We rephrase a result of Ledyard (1978)
as saying that there are no Bayesian incentive compatible and non-parametric18 mechanisms
which are not at the same time revealing in dominant strategies. An incentive compatible
mechanism is non-parametric, if it doesnt depend on parameters characterizing a particular
economy, such as a prior probability distribution or its moments. If we insist on this, then,
nothing can be gained by replacing the requirement of dominant strategy equilibrium with
the weaker notion of Bayesian Nash equilibrium19. It will be reassuring to discover below
that, in our particular setting, the restriction to dominant strategies has no additional welfare
cost, given that we rely on a representation mechanism20.
18In the sense of Hurwicz (1972).
19For more recent (and more sophisticated) justications of dominant strategy mechanisms, see again
Chung and Ely (2004) and Bergemann and Morris (2004). The result of Bergemann and Morris (2004)
applies in our case, because the recourse to representation (i.e., the existence of passive citizens) breaks the
budget constraint.
20One could of course imagine sophisticated mechanisms in which the executive asks agents to reveal
their subjective beliefs. These beliefs being subjective, it seems however intuitively obvious that, if the
Founding Fathersgoal is to collect costly information about preferences e¢ ciently, they should concentrate
on preference-type revelation. This should be true under any assumption embodying the reasonable idea
that each agents knowledge of his (her) own preferences is more accurate than what others possibly think
about them.
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On top of this, we dene a representation mechanism as immune from executive
opportunism, if it simply does not leave any margin of manoeuvre to the executive, all
parameters being specied in the constitution, i.e., 0 = fg. In a more general setting,
complete immunity from executive opportunism could be socially costly, but in the present
model, the hands of the executive can be easily and costlessly tied by xing mechanism
parameters in the constitution. This notion has consequences, as will appear below, since
it conicts with the requirement of informational robustness, and forbids the use of some
otherwise naturalmechanisms. The notion of immunity can be viewed as a formal trick
to eliminate parametric mechanisms of a certain kind: those depending on the mean vP of
individual valuations in the rst place (see 3.3. below). In a more realistictheory, there
would exist some trade-o¤ between the social value of tying the executives hands and the
social value of letting the executive make choices to a certain extent, which doesnt exist in
the simplied world described here. This is a direction for further research: the study of
economies in which 0 is not a singleton because it is socially optimal to endow the executive
with some discretionary powers. Presumably the citizenspreferences agree, or exhibit very
low variance, for certain things. The executive would then be allowed to make decisions on
these consensual matters. In a less stylized model, the optimal degree of discretion would
not be zero.
Finally, we add a technical requirement. A representation mechanism is said to satisfy
the condition of non-imposition, if for all x 2 X, there exists a bv 2 V n such that x = f(bv).
This condition is almost innocuous, for if some x will never be chosen, then it may be
excluded from the set X21. We conclude this discussion with a denition.
Denition 2. A representation mechanism (f; t;0) is manipulation-proof (hereafter MP)
if it is revealing in dominant strategies, immune from executive opportunism and satises
the condition of non-imposition.
21The condition of non-imposition has some power, however, if it is assumed that there are at least three
elements in X.
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3.3 Informational robustness
The Founding Fathers, willing to design a constitution that can adapt to the largest possible
set of societies, as represented by the true, but unknown, probability distribution P , do not
want the representation mechanism to be taylored too closely to a particular society, for
it would not resist changes in the distribution of preferences. Indeed, if many citizens are
consistently hurt by collective decisions, they will ght the system in one way or another.
Informational robustness is a form of stability requirement. We propose a way of formalizing
this idea below.
The chosen mechanism should be independent of a particular distribution of prefer-
ences, but this task might be impossible to accomplish if the mechanism must at the same
time satisfy optimality properties. Intuitively, parameters, including prior information on
the distribution of preferences, should be xed in the constitution, to avoid possible manip-
ulation by the executive, but, at the same time, the constitution should be exible enough
to adapt (and therefore remain optimal) in a large class of possible societies. To illustrate
this tension, let us assume for a moment that the distribution P is common knowledge, and
known to the FF.
The welfare function is dened as,
Wn(f) =  (nF + F0) +
NX
i=0
vi(f): (6)
It is the di¤erence between the utilitarian measure of welfare, and the costs of constitutional
organisation, including the variable social cost nF of the representatives, and the xed cost
of the executive. Given the knowledge of P , the best that the FF can do is to choose (f; t)
so as to maximize EP [Wn (f)]. Now, remark that,
EP [Wn (f)] = EP [EP (Wn (f) j bv)] :
Given the assumed independence of valuations (Assumption 2), and dropping the parameter
 to lighten notation, we get,
EP [Wn (f)] =  (nF + F0) + EP
(
nX
i=1
bvi [f(bv)] + (N + 1  n)vP [f(bv)]) ; (7)
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(recall that vP (x) = EP [vi (x) j x] for all x 2 X). It follows from (7) that the rst-best
optimal decision rule, denoted fP (bv), solves the problem,
max
x2X
(
nX
i=1
bvi (x) + (N + 1  n)vP (x)) ;
for all bv 2 V n, that is, maximizes the term between curly brackets in (7) pointwise. With
our assumptions, and in particular Assumption 3, if the executive was in charge of, and free
to choose vP , he or she could simply set
vP (x) =
 1
N + 1  n
 
nX
i=1
bvi (x)  v0(x) + t0 (bv)! ;
implying that the rule fP maximizes v0 t0, i.e., the executives private utility function. This
is why a constitutional specication of the parameter vP is needed. This mechanism becomes
immune to executive opportunism if  = V and 0 = fvPg, i.e., if the mean valuation vP is
specied in the constitution. But then, the representation mechanism trivially depends on
a particular preference distribution P , which contradicts the requirement of informational
robustness. Unless the FF agree on this particular distribution, or, in other words, unless
their priorM concentrates all probability on P , the usualrst best rule fP cannot be part
of a robust constitution22.
A reasonable solution to this problem is to dene a mechanism as informationally
robust, if it maximizes expected welfare, when the expectation is taken with respect to some
vague or uninformative prior M . A representation mechanism is then dened as simply
robust, if it is informationally robust, subject to the manipulation-proofness constraint. To
do this rigorously, we must take care of the well-known di¢ culties associated with improper
prior distributions in Bayesian statistics. Recall that is the mean of individual valuations
v; that M is the marginal distribution of , and that T denotes the precision matrix of M ,
i.e., T = [CovM()]
 1.
22If P was unknown to the FF, but was at the same time common knowledge among the agents, then, one
could imagine a complete information revelation procedure to reveal P , and then use P as an input in the
decision process, as proposed above. But we do not take these common knowledge properties for granted,
and did not assume the existence of a common prior. In our setting, the goal of the public decision process
is not to reveal hidden information to an asymmetrically informed planner, it is, literally, to produce pieces
of otherwise non-existent information, by means of a costly sample of representatives.
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Denition 3. (Robust RepresentationMechanisms). A representation mechanism (f ; t;0)
is robust, if it is manipulation proof (MP), and if there exists a sequence of di¤use prior
distributions (Mr), with an associated sequence of probabilistic beliefs (Qr) (derived from
(Mr) using expression (3) above), such that,
(a) the associated sequence of precision matrices
 
T r

vanishes, i.e., T r ! 0, as r ! +1;
(b) for each integer r, there exists a MP representation mechanism (fr; tr;r) such that
(fr; tr) maximizes the expected welfare EQr [Wn(f)], on the set of MP representation mech-
anisms;
(c) and (fr; tr)! (f ; t), as r ! +1, pointwise.
In essence, Denition 3 says that a representation mechanism is robust if it is the limit
of a converging sequence of manipulation-proof representation mechanisms, each element in
the sequence maximizing the expression of expected welfare obtained with increasingly vague
and di¤use priors. The requirements of robustness are quite strong; yet, we will exhibit an
interesting member of the species below.
4 Characterization and Existence of Robust Represen-
tation Mechanisms
Given the requirements of political robustness, our representation mechanisms must assume
a simple form, as stated in the following theorem23.
Theorem 1 Under assumptions 1-6, V = <l; and jXj = l  3, let n be xed. Then,
(f; t;0) is manipulation-proof if and only if, (a),
f(bv) 2 argmax
x2X
(
nX
i=1
bvi(x) + k(x)) ;
for all bv 2 V n, where k is an arbitrary function X ! <; (b), for all i = 1; :::; n,
ti(bv) =   nX
j 6=i;j=1
bvj [f (bv)]  k [f (bv)]  h (bv i) (8)
23Remark that this result characterizes manipulation-proof mechanisms only: the notion of (informational)
robustness (i.e., Denition 3) plays no role here.
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where h is an arbitrary mapping, depending on the bvj, j 6= i only; t0 is given by the budget
constraint, i.e.,
t0(bv) =  1
N + 1  n
nX
i=1
ti(bv);
and (c), the parameter space writes  = V H, where H is the set of mappings V n 1 ! <,
and parameters are fully specied in the constitution, i.e., 0 = f(k; h)g.
For proof, see the appendix.
The strongest part of the above statement is the only ifpart. It is a classic exercise
to show that a decision rule with the form given by Theorem 1 can be implemented in
dominant strategies with the help of the transfers dened by expression (8), whatever the
choice made for the arbitrary function k. These tranfers are a particular form of the classic
Groves scheme. Expression (8) then provides us with a MP mechanism if k and h (the latter
function being interpreted as the representativesbase wage), cannot be manipulated by
the executive. To achieve this goal, it is su¢ cient to specify (k; h) in the constitution. The
di¢ cult part of the proof is to show that a MP representation mechanism can only be of this
form. To this end, a deep result of K. Roberts (1979) provides us with a major step.
Note that under this representation mechanism, the budget is always balanced. This
is in turn due to the denition of t0 and the fact that there is at least one passive citizen in
the revelation game, i.e., n < N +1, there is at least one individual (i.e., the executive) who
does not report a preference type. If the mechanism was a direct democracy, in which
every agent sends a message, revelation in dominant strategies could be incompatible with
budget balance (e.g. Green and La¤ont (1979)).
We have shown that MP mechanisms make decisions which maximize some sum of
utilities, but the arbitrary function k appearing in expression (8) can be chosen in such
a way that anything ranging from representative democracy (i.e. k = 0), and sheer
dictatorship (i.e., take jkj arbitrarily large relative to the sum of the representativesutilities)
is implementable in this sense. Thus, the Founding Fathersinuence on the future behaviour
of institutions can be overwhelming, just by their choice of a small weight placed on the
representativespreferences in the decision-making process. Dictatorship being ordinarily
dened as the imposition of a single actual persons preferences on everybody else, a crushing
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weight of k more precisely represents a form of predetermination coming from above, which
can be called the Reign of Tradition.
An interesting question is now to choose the value of k optimally,that is here, in a
robust way. According to Denition 3 above, to this end, we should pick a robust mechanism
in the larger set of MP mechanisms. The next result shows that k = 0, an intuitively focal
and democratic choice, is robust, thereby proving that the set of robust mechanisms is not
empty.
Theorem 2 Under assumptions 1-7, V = <l; and jXj = l  3, the following mechanism is
robust: the mapping f satises,
f(bv) 2 argmax
x2X
(
nX
i=1
bvi(x)) ; (9)
the transfers t are dened by expression (8) above with k = 0, and h is specied in the
constitution, i.e.,  = V H, and 0 = f(0; h)g.
For proof, see the appendix.
We have proved the existence, but not the uniqueness of robust mechanisms. However,
if there are robust choices other than k = 0, they must be very contrived, and are most
likely uninteresting. Our solution puts all the weight on observations, i.e., the sample of
representativespreferences, and a zero weight on the Founding Fathersprior estimates of
willingnesses to pay. This result is obtained with a standard Bayesian approach: the robust
decision rule is the limit of a sequence of optimal Bayesian decision rules obtained when
prior knowledge becomes increasingly vague in an appropriate way. If prior probabilities are
extremely vague, prior knowledge is not very reliable, and more weight should be given to
sample observations (i.e., the representativespreferences). Therefore, intuitively, k must
converge towards 0.
On top of robustness, we can show that k = 0 has several other appealing properties,
which cannot be satised by any other choice. First of all, k = 0 is the only choice which is
unbiased in the following sense: it is the only MP mechanism whose decisions are based on
an unbiased estimate of the true expected welfare, and this, for all probability distribution
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P on V . Formally, one can dene a given k as uniformly unbiased if for all P , there exists a
number  > 0, such that
EP
"
nX
i=1
vi(x) + k(x)
#
= EP
"
1
N + 1
NX
i=0
vi(x)
#
:
This clearly implies  = 1=n and k = 0, for otherwise, k would depend on P , which is not
permitted. But unbiasedness is not desirable per se. In decision or statistical problems in
which a particular utility function should be used to rank decision rules, some biased esti-
mates can be more desirable than unbiased ones, if they lead, say, to more precise evaluations
of relevant parameters. This is why we needed a more radical, decision-theoretic denition
of robust mechanisms; but we get uniform unbiasedness as an interesting by-product of
robustness.
Our robust decision rule can also be called democratic because it depends on informa-
tion about preferences that has been transmitted by the people only, through the represen-
tation process. The other MP rules, with non-zero k functions, would always bear the risk
of being biased towards some preference, and would therefore be less purely democratic.
On more intuitive grounds, k = 0 is also the only fully impartial and democratic
choice, among the MP mechanisms in that it solves an imaginary dispute among Founding
Fathers. Assume that there are several of these FF, that each FF is a rational and benevolent
expected utility maximizer. The FF have the same utility function (which is the utilitarian
sum of valuations), but they have di¤ering probabilistic beliefs P . Assume in addition that all
the FF are extremely stubborn. Each of them believes that he knows the true distribution and
irreducibly disagrees with the others. They still need to reach an agreement. Now, assume
that the FF are o¤ered to inspect a sample of the citizens preferences before a decision is
made. To solve their bargaining problem, before the sample comes to be known, wouldnt
they agree to let the nal decision depend on sample information only? (For comments on
a similar story,see Savage (1972), chap. 10). A reasonable decision rule, which must be
chosen by the FF before sample information is disclosed, would then depend only (and thus
put all the weight) on sample information.
Remark also that we could have made the theory look stronger if the Founding Fathers
had not been assumed Utilitarian from the start. Using a construction à la Harsanyi (1955),
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we could have derived the Utilitarian doctrine of the FF as a consequence of their Bayesian
rationality, combined with their position of impartial observers, behind the veil of ignorance.
With our robust mechanism, not only are representatives provided with incentives to
report truthfully information on their preferences, but also, once subjected to the Groves
transfer scheme dened above, sample members unanimously support the robust decision
rule (9). To see this, note that the utility of a representative writes,
ui =
nX
j=1
vj(f(v)) + h(v i)  F;
and it follows that all representatives share the same objective, and would like to see f
implemented. More precisely, given v, none of them would like f to be changed for another
decision rule.
We have not proposed a particular choice for the function h, which remains arbitrary,
given that it plays no role in the determination of x and in the expression of social welfare.
If we were to consider seriously the question of individual rationality, and more precisely the
willingness of representatives to participate, we should adjust the function h to make sure
that they do not lose, in expected terms, from accepting the job and paying the cost F . This
can be done at the expense of the passive taxpayers. An appealing, non-parametric choice
for h is the Clarke pivotal mechanism, (which is a particular case of the Groves mechanism).
The Clarke transfer function guarantees the best minimal utility levels, as shown by a result
of Moulin (1986)24, it is dened by setting:
h(v i) = F  max
x2X
X
j 6=i
vj(x):
To sum up, we have exhibited a representation mechanism which solves some impor-
tant problems in a simplied representative democracy: the sampling procedure reduces the
cost of collective decision-making, while at the same time ensuring honest representation,
and adherence of representatives to the pursuit of general interest.
Some important issues remain however. The model does not consider the question
of the choice and election of representatives. The random sampling procedure is a shortcut,
a way of black-boxing the electoral process and the party system, allowing us to study
24See also Moulin (1988), chap. 8.
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the structure of the representation problem under the assumption that an ideally unbiased
electoral system can be found and implemented.
We do not defend random representation as a practical solution for democratic soci-
eties. This question has been discussed by others (see, among other writings, Dahl (1970)).
The topic has also attracted the interest of the Public Choice school, e.g., Mueller et al.
(1972), Tullock (1977). Representation by lot did exist in the Ancient Greece (e.g., Hansen
(1991)), and in some other societies of the past. There are probably good reasons for which
these systems have not survived in modern times (e.g., Manin (1995)), except for some
institutions like criminal court jurys.
Viewed as a revelation mechanism, our robust representation system can be called a
sampling Groves mechanism, because it is applied to a sample of agents only. This random
decision rule has some nice properties, one of them being that it is a good second-best
approximation to the rst-best Pareto optimum. The quality of this approximation increases
when the dispersion of preferences decreases, and for a given sampling rate n=N , when the
total population size N grows large, due to the Law of Large Numbers25.
Finally, we should address the problem of the number n of representatives. A large
value of n reduces sampling errors, but increases the total cost of representation nF . The
optimal n should trade o¤ these benets and costs. In our view, n cannot be xed in
the constitution, because it typically depends on prior information about the dispersion of
preferences, as will be shown in the next section. This is why we do not propose a robust
theory of this number. In the real world, the number of representatives is not xed in
constitutions. In the United States, the number of seats in the House of Representatives has
increased during the 19th century and reached a ceiling of 435 in 1910, which has been xed
by statute in 192926. In France, this number is specied by an organic act of Parliament,
which is higher in the hierarchy of norms than an ordinary act, but below the constitution.
To follow the evolution of society, and population growth in the rst place, the number of
representatives can be changed without changing the constitution.
25Given that the budget is balanced, revelation in dominant strategies and Pareto optimality are known
to be incompatible in this context, and approximate optimality is the best that we can hope for. For more
details on the properties of sampling Groves mechanisms see Gary-Bobo and Jaaidane (2000).
26See OConnor and Sabato (1993), p. 191.
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5 An Illustrative Example
To illustrate the concepts introduced above and the workings of the theory, we now com-
pute an example of our model. Explicit computations make it clear then, that, to discuss
the optimal number of representatives requires some prior information on the dispersion of
preferences.
A utility function vi can be viewed as a vector of <l, that is, vi = (vi(x))x2X . If
probability distribution P is known, the vi are independent normal vectors. We further
assume that for each i, the coordinates of vi are uncorrelated with the same xed variance
2, and more precisely, that vi v N (; 2I), where  = ((x))x2X 2 <l and I is the
identity matrix of dimension l. To specify the FFs priorM , assume that  itself is normally
distributed with mean , and that the coordinates of  are independent with variance z2,
that is,  v N (; z2I). Under this specication, strictly speaking, M is not di¤use in the
sense of Denition 3, because we view 2 as non-random, but this simplication is, in fact,
harmless. Dene bV (x) =Pni=1 vi(x) and denote bV the vector with coordinates bV (x), x 2 X.
Under these normality assumptions, it is a well-known result from Bayesian statistical
theory (see De Groot (1970), chap. 9.5), that, denoting the sample of utilities bv = (v1; :::; vn),
EQ [ j bv] = 2+ z2bV
2 + z2n
: (10)
Introducing the variance (or precision) ratio  = 2=z2, we get the expression EQ [ j bv] =
( + n) 1(+ bV ), and it is easy to see that, if the prior M becomes increasingly dispersed,
then  ! 0, and
EQ [ j bv]! bV
n
; (11)
the posterior expected mean of the distribution converges to the arithmetic average of the
observed utility vectors.
We can now compute the expected welfare, from the point of view of the FF, given
that the decision rule depends on bv = (v1; :::; vn) only, that is, x = f(bv). By denition, and
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the law of conditional expectation,
EQ [Wn(f)] =  (nF + F0) + EQ
"
NX
i=0
vi(f)
#
=  (nF + F0) + EQ
"
EQ
"
NX
i=0
vi(f) j bv##
=  (nF + F0) + EQ
24bV (f) + X
j =2f1;:::;ng
EQ [vj(f) j bv]
35 (12)
Now, given that the vj are independent, and using the law of conditional expectations again,
we get for all j = n+ 1; :::; N and j = 0,
EQ [vj(f) j bv] = EQ [EQ [vj(f) j bv; ] j bv]
= EQ [(f) j bv] ; (13)
so that, nally, using the above assumptions and results,
EQ [Wn(f)] =  (nF + F0) + EQ
hbV (f) + (N + 1  n)EQ [(f) j bv]i
=  (nF + F0) +  +N + 1
 + n
EQ
nbV (f) + k(f)o ; (14)
where,
k(x) =
(N + 1  n)
 +N + 1
(x): (15)
We know from Theorem 1 that f is manipulation-proof if it chosen so as to maximizebV (x) + k(x) with respect to x for each bv, and that any manipulation-proof rule is of this
form for some k. The robust decision rule f , which maximizes bV (x), is clearly obtained by
taking the limit of k(x) when  ! 0, that is, as shown by (15), k(x)  0.
We now substitute the robust rule f  in the expression of expected welfare (14).
Remark that with the robust rule f = f , we get by denition,
E
hbV (f )i = E max
x2X
nbV (x)o : (16)
To push our computations further, let us simplify the model. Assume that the number
of alternatives is the minimum necessary, that is, l = 3: the set X contains three objects
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denoted xk with k = 1; 2; 3. Assume also that the coordinates of  have the same mean m,
i.e.,  = (m;m;m). Denote the arithmetic average of utilities V = (1=n)bV . Then, clearly,
V has a normal distribution with mean (m;m;m), and has independent coordinates. The
variance of each V (x) can be computed as follows, using the classic variance decomposition
formula:
V ar(V (x)) = V ar

E
 
V (x) j ; 2+ E V ar  V (x) j ; 2
= V ar((x)) + E

2
n

= z2 +
2
n
: (17)
On the other hand, we know (e.g., Johnson et al. (1994)), that if the random variables Yk
are independent and Yk v N (0; 1), then,
E [max fY1; Y2; Y3g] = 3
2
p

(18)
From this we derive the following,
EQ
h
max
x
nbV (x)oi = nEQ hmax
x

V (x)
	i
= nm+ n
r
z2 +
2
n
E
"
max
x
(
V (x) mp
z2 + 2=n
)#
= nm+ n
r
z2 +
2
n
E [max fY1; Y2; Y3g]
= nm+
3n
2
p

r
z2 +
2
n
: (19)
Using this result, we can obtain the expression of expected welfare. After some straightfor-
ward algebra, we get from (14), (15), (16) and (19),
EQ [Wn(f)] =  (nF + F0) + (N + 1)m+ (n; 2; z2); (20)
where by denition,
(n; 2; z2) =
3
2
p


2 + (N + 1)z2
r n
2 + nz2
: (21)
Expression (20) is not well dened when  = 0, because it happens that (n; 2; z2)! +1
as z2 ! +127. The optimal number of representatives should be adapted to circumstances,
27The function EQ [Wn(f)] is therefore not well-dened at  = 0.
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and typically depends on the dispersion of preferences. Any interesting computation of this
number will therefore depend on prior information on the distribution of preferences. We
dene as optimal the value of n which maximizes expected welfare for given m,  and z.
It is easy to show that  is a strictly concave function of n, viewed as a positive real
variable. It follows that if the optimal real solution is interior, i.e., 1 < n < N , then it must
solve the following necessary and su¢ cient condition,
@(n; 2; z2)
@n
= F: (22)
The optimal number is then the integer which is nearest to the solution n of (22). Remark
that n does not depend on the prior mean m, but on the variances 2 and z2. It can also be
shown that the marginal value of an additional representative increases with the dispersion
of preferences, and that the optimal number of representatives decreases with the cost of
representation F , and increases with both the dispersion of preferences and the size of the
population N . These predictions are reassuring28.
In general, our robust approach has no reason to coincide with what would have been
a standard approach to this problem, that is, assuming that some probability distribution P
is common knowledge, and choosing f so as to maximize bV (x)+ (N +1 n)vP (x), as shown
by (7) above. A substitution of f = fP in the expression for expected welfare will typically
not lead to the same optimal number of representatives as (22).
6 Conclusion
We have considered a class of representation mechanisms, based on reports made by a ran-
dom subset of agents, in a collective choice problem with quasi-linear utilities. The absence of
a benevolent planner, combined with the absence of common prior probability distributions,
has led us to dene a new notion of robustness. A robust mechanism must be, (i), revealing
in dominant strategies (whatever the probabilistic beliefs of the agents) and immune from
opportunistic manipulations on the part of the executive, who is not assumed benevolent,
and (ii), it maximizes expected welfare under a vague prior distribution, representing the
28For results on the optimal number of representatives, see Auriol and Gary-Bobo (2000).
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Founding Fathersignorance as to the real prole of individual preferences. Robust mech-
anisms are characterized as a variant of Groves mechanisms, and their existence is shown.
The robust mechanism that we exhibit puts all the weighton the representativesreports
while computing the collective decision. It is fully non-parametric in the sense that it does
not depend on prior information about preferences, and is therefore not taylored to a partic-
ular society. In contrast, the usual approach to this problem would have made the optimal
mechanism depend on the benevolent planners prior probabilistic beliefs. These results can
be viewed as a step in an attempt to construct a normative theory of public-decision making
under very weak informational assumptions, and by giving a formal content to the idea that
there is no benevolent planner.
7 Appendix: proofs
Proof of Theorem 1.
(If) It is a standard result to show that (f; t), as dened in the statement of Theorem
1, is revealing in dominant strategies with any function k and any function h 2 H. Given
that the functions k and h are xed in the constitution, the executive cannot manipulate
them. It follows that the mechanism is also immune from executive opportunism (hereafter
IEO), and therefore MP.
(Only if) This part of the proof uses a characterization result of Kevin Roberts (1979).
Theorem (Roberts). If f : V N+1 ! X is a collective decision rule which satises the
condition of non-imposition and is implementable in dominant strategies, then, there exists a
vector of weights  2 <N+1;   0,  6= 0, and a determinate real-valued function k : X ! <
such that for all v 2 V N+1,
f(v) 2
(
x 2 X : k(x) +
NX
i=0
ivi(x)  k(y) +
NX
i=0
ivi(y) 8 y 2 X
)
:
Given this result, condition IEO imposes 0 = 0 and j = 0 for all j = n + 1; :::N . If this
was not the case, by Assumption 3 (subsidiarity of the executive), Agent 0 would have to
provide for the missing information (vj), for j = 0, and j = n + 1; :::; N , in all the cases in
which n < N , thus obviously contradicting IEO.
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Now, if the weights 1 to n where not all equal, i.e., 1 = ::: = n, the decision
rule would violate Assumption 6, the principle of weak equality, for all agents are ex ante
indistinguishable29. Without loss of generality, then, all weights can be set equal to one. It
is also a well-known result (cf. Roberts (1979)) that f can be implemented with the help
of transfer schemes belonging to the extended Groves familyonly, that is, transfers of the
form
ti(bv) =   1
i
"X
j 6=i
jbvj(f) + k(f)#  hi(bv i)
The function hi appearing in the transfer formula must be the same for every representative,
because of Assumption 6 again. We therefore get transfers of the form given by (8), in the
statement of Theorem 1.
Finally, the mechanism under scrutiny is IEO, and therefore MP, only if the functions
k and h are xed in the constitution. If this was not the case, using the budget balance
condition (1), and the denition of transfers (8), we would get,
t0 =
1
N + 1  n
 
nX
i=1
h(bv i) + nk(f) + (n  1) nX
i=1
bvi(f)! :
Now, t0 being the tax paid by the executive, he (she) could manipulate k and h, to his (her)
own advantage. Choosing small values of h would reduce the tax, while choosing the value of
k can obviously bias the public decision toward the executives private preferences v0. Thus,
to obtain a MP mechanism, k and h must be xed in the constitution.
Q.E.D.
The Normal-Wishart Distribution
In the following proof, we use a particular specication for the prior probability distribution
M of the Founding Fathers. M is a distribution of the parameters (; T ), where by denition,
29Representatives being chosen by lot, they cannot be labeled in advance, because their weight is attached
to their function as representative, and not to a particular individual in society. This means that the
Executive would be in charge of labeling the representatives. Now, the weights i should be attributed to
representatives independently of their message bvi. If these weights are not equal but xed in the Constitution,
the Executive could still choose the agents label ex post and manipulate the decision. The anonymity
condition 1 = ::: = n forbids any such manipulation on the part of the Executive.
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T =  1 is the precision matrix of the multivariate normal distribution of vi, i.e., given that
we have assumed vi v N (;) for all i. The mean vector  belongs to <l and T is a positive
denite, symmetric matrix of dimension l  l, which is an element of <l+ <l(l 1)=2.
From the point of view of the FF, the precision matrix T is random as well as the
mean vector . This random matrix T is said to have a Wishart distribution with p degrees
of freedom and precision matrix   if its density can be written,
g(T j p; ) = c j jp=2 jT j(p l 1)=2 exp [ (1=2)tr ( T )] ;
where tr(A) denotes the trace of matrix A, i.e., the sum of its diagonal elements30, and c
is the appropriate normalisation constant31. We have E(T ) = p  1, and the distribution is
di¤use.
Denition: M is said to be Normal-Wishart with parameters (p; ; ; ), if the joint distri-
bution of (; T ) is as follows: the conditional distribution of  knowing that T = R is a
multivariate normal distribution with mean vector  and precision matrix R,  > 0, and
the marginal distribution of the precision matrix T is a Wishart distribution with p degrees
of freedom and precision matrix  , such that p > l   1.
The following result can be proved.
Lemma 1 (see De Groot (1970), 5.6, 9.11). If M is a Normal-Wishart distribution with
parameters (p; ; ; ), then, the marginal distribution of  is a multivariate Student t dis-
tribution with p  l+1 degrees of freedom, precision matrix (p  l+1)  1, and E() = .
Consider now the sample of preferences bv = (v1; :::; vn). It happens that the Normal-
Wishart family is a conjugate family of distributions when vi is normally distributed, i.e.,
the posterior distribution of (; T j bv) is also of the Normal-Wishart type. More precisely,
we can state the following result.
Lemma 2 (see De Groot (1970), 9.9-9.11). Suppose that bv = (v1; :::; vn) is a random sample
from a multivariate normal distribution with an unknown value of the mean vector  and the
precision matrix T . Suppose that the prior joint distribution of (; T ) is Normal-Wishart
30The determinant of matrix A is denoted jAj.
31The Wishart distribution is a multivariate extension of the 2 distribution.
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with parameters (p; ; ; ). Then, the posterior marginal distribution of  knowing bv is a
multivariate Student t distribution with p+ n  l + 1 degrees of freedom and
E ( j bv) = ( + n) 1 + bV  : (23)
Proof of Theorem 2.
First compute the expected welfare, from the point of view of the FF, given that the decision
rule f depends on bv = (v1; :::; vn) only, that is, x = f(bv). By denition,
EQ [Wn(f)] =  (nF + F0) + EQ
"
NX
i=0
vi(f)
#
(24)
By the laws of conditional expectation,
EQ
"
NX
i=0
vi(f)
#
= EQ
"
EQ
"
NX
i=0
vi(f)jbv##
= EQ
24bV (f) + X
j =2f1;:::;ng
EQ [vj(f) j bv]
35 ; (25)
where bV (x)  Pni=1 vi(x). Now, given that the vj are independent, and using the law of
conditional expectation again, we get for all j = n+ 1; :::; N and j = 0,
EQ [vj(f (bv)) j bv] = EQ [EQ[vj(f (bv)) j bv;; T ] j bv]
= EQ [(f (bv)) j bv] ; (26)
Using this result, we can write,
EQ [Wn(f)] =  (nF + F0) + EQ
hbV (f) + (N + 1  n)EQ [(f) j bv]i : (27)
We now construct a sequence of di¤use prior distributions, denoted (Mr) with the properties
required by Denition 3. Let each element in the sequence be a Normal-Wishart distribution
with parameters (pr; r; r; r) and assume that the sequence (pr; r; r) converges toward
some nite limit (p1; 1; 1), that pr > l and j rj 6= 0 for all r, and that r ! 0 as
r ! +1. By Lemma 1, the precision matrix of the prior marginal distribution of  is
r(pr   l + 1)  1r and converges toward 0 as r !1. Point (a) in Denition 3 is satised:
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We now compute the expected welfare under distribution Qr, derived from Mr using
expression (3) above. By Lemma 2, we get,
EQr [ j bv] = rr + bVr + n : (28)
Substituting (28) into (27) yields, after some straightforward algebra,
EQr [Wn(f)] =  (nF + F0) +
N + 1 + r
r + n
EQr
hbV (f) + kr(f)i ; (29)
where,
kr(x) =
(N + 1  n)r
(N + 1 + r)
r(x): (30)
A glance at expression (29) now shows that a decision rule fr satisfying,
fr(bv) 2 argmax
x2X
nbV (x) + kr(x)o ; (31)
for all bv, achieves the unconstrained maximum of EQr [Wn(f)] with respect to f : V n ! X. In
addition, by Theorem 1, there exists a vector of transfers tr with which fr can be implemented
in dominant strategies. The transfers must assume the form given by expression (8) above
with k = kr, and with any given function h. The value of expected welfare does not depend
on these transfer functions and m. Choose 0r = f(kr; h)g. The representation mechanism
(fr; tr;
0
r) is MP, and therefore, it also maximizes EQr [Wn(f)] on the set of MP mechanisms.
Point (b) of Denition 3 is satised.
It is then easy to check that, by (30), kr ! 0, because r ! 0, and r remains
bounded, as r ! 1. Given that X is a nite set, taking a converging subsequence of fr if
necessary, we get fr ! f  2 argmaxxfbV (x)g, as r ! 1, for all bv. It follows that point (c)
of Denition 3 is satised.
Q.E.D.
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